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This Article summarizes important developments in 2016 in international
antitrust law in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European
Union, India, Japan, Korea, South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United
States.

I.
A.

Argentina'
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In March, the new Administration of the Argentine Antitrust Commission
(Commission) was appointed. The new President of the Commission is
Esteban Greco, an economist who worked on several antitrust matters
before joining the authority. Four new members have also been appointed:
Maria Fernanda Viecens, Marina R. Bidart, Pablo Trevisan and Eduardo
Stordeur.2
The new Administration is planning to amend the current Antitrust Law
No. 25,156 (Antitrust Law). However, there is no projection on when this
new Antitrust Law will take effect and if its provisions (detailed below) will
pass unchanged by Congress.
B.

MERGERS

In 2016, the number of notifiable merger transactions continued to
increase due to the devaluation of the Argentine Peso. The USD
200,000,000 threshold that was set out in 1999 (when the Antitrust Law was
enacted) is currently equivalent to approximately USD 13,000,000. Due to
the significant workload from these transactions, there has been a great delay
and the timeframe for review has increased. However, with the new
Administration, the review timeframe decreased from thirty-six months to
an average of approximately twenty-four to thirty months (even in non1. The section on Argentina was authored by Miguel del Pino, Marval, O'Farrell & Mairal.
2. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1190/2016 issued on November 22, 2016, the members
of the Commission have the tide of undersecretary. See Decreto 1190/2016, Nov. 22, 2016,

B.O. (Arg.).
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material transactions with minimum or no overlaps). In 2016, the
Commission cleared fifty transactions, while no rulings imposing remedies
or rejecting transactions were issued.
Regarding merger control analysis, the proposed amendment to the
current Antitrust Law would principally entail (1) an increase of the merger
control thresholds and the amounts for exemptions and fines, (2) a
suspensory system, (3) the inclusion of a filing fee, (4) the participation of
third parties, and (5) a fast track procedure for simple notification dockets.3
C.

CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

On September 1, 2016, the Commission issued Resolution No. 18,4
requesting Prisma Medios de Pago S.A. and its shareholders (namely, the
most important banks in Argentina and Visa International Inc.) to explain
alleged antitrust conduct.
The Commission considered Prisma Medios de Pago SA and its
shareholders responsible for carrying out the following antitrust conducts: a)
competitive restrictions based on prices charged to users; b) competitive
restrictions based on financing; and c) restrictions in order to inter-operate
with competitors.
In addition to this investigation, the Commission has ordered the
commencement of other market investigations in the following industries:
(1) aluminum, (2) steel, (3) petrochemical, (4) mobile communications, (5)
oil, (6) milk, (7) meat, (8) detergents, (9) passenger ground transportation,
(10) air transportation, (11) supermarkets, and (12) pharmaceuticals.s
D.

COURT

DECISIONS

The Federal Court of Appeals of the City of Comodoro Rivadavia's
decision that overturned the Commission's decision ordering almost all car
3. See Alfaro Abogados, August 2016 Newsletter: The Argentine Antitrust Agency Will Be
Sending to Congress a Bill to Introduce Positive Amendments to the Antitrust Law, available at http://
www.theworldlawgroup.com/wlg/Antitrust-Competition.asp.
4. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Latin American and Caribbean
Competition Forum Session III: Addressing Competition Challengesin FinancialMarkets (Contribution
of Argentina) (Mar. 23,
2017), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplay

documentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/LACF(2017)13&docLanguage=En.
5. See Esteban Pablo Ropolo, The Argentine Antitrust Commission Initiates an Investigation
Against Credit Card Issuers, LlxoLocY GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEws (Sept. 6, 2016), http://

www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=58853e3a-5d88-433c-a8c9-534fla356360

("The

market investigation is only one of the eleven market investigations initiated by the Antitrust
Commission under its new leadership (other investigations include the meat market, the
laundry soaps market, mobile telecommunications market and passenger transport market,
among others)").
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terminals active in Argentina to pay the highest fine ever for price fixing is
still under review. 6
H.

Australia7

A.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In March 2015, the Competition Policy Review ("The Harper Review")
issued its final report, completing the first major review of Australian
competition law in over two decades and containing fifty-six
recommendations on Australian competition policies and institutions.
In 2016, Australian Government released "Exposure Draft Legislation"
(Competition and Consumer Amendment (Competition and Policy Review) Bill
2016), aimed at implementing the majority of the Harper Review
recommendations.8
Significantly, the Exposure Draft purports to amend section 45 of the
Competition and Consumer Act (CCA) to provide that a corporation must not
"engage with one or more persons in a concerted practice that has the
purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening
competition." This language will replace the presently narrower iteration of
section 45, which requires "contracts, arrangements or understandings" to
demonstrably affect competition before attracting liability.9
Further, the Bill included an "effects test" to the "misuse of market
power" under section 46 of the CCA. The amended section prohibits
corporations with a "substantial degree of [market] power" from engaging in
conduct that "has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of
substantially lessening competition in that or any other market."o This will
replace the current section 46 test, which requires that corporations "take
advantage" of their substantial market power for some illegal purpose.
Legislation amending section 46 of the Act was introduced into
Parliament on December 1, 2016, with the Competition and Consumer
Amendment (Misuse of Market Power) Bill 2016, while the additional

&

6. Julhin Pefia & Frederico Rossi, Argentina-Court of Appeals Revokes Highest Cartel Fine
Imposed by Argentina's Antitrust Authority (Dec. 2015), http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Antitrust
TradeLawSection/Antitrust/Publications.aspx.
7. The section on Australia was authored by Elizabeth M Avery and Sally Kirk, Gilbert

Tobin.
8. Exposure Draft - Competition and Consumer Amendment (Competition Policy Review) Bill
2016 (Austl.), https://consult.treasury.gov.au/market-and-competition-policy-division/
edcompetition lawamendments/supporting-documents/ExposureDraft.pdf.
9. Elizabeth Avery, Simon Muys, & Matt Rubinstein, Rethinking the Competition and
Consumer Act: Exposure Draft Legislation Lays Groundwork for the Most Significant Change in a
Generation, GILBERT & ToIN INsIGHTs (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.gtlaw.com.au/insights/
rethinking-competition-and-consumer-act-exposure-draft-legislation-lays-groundwork-mostsignificant.

10. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) § 46 (Austl.).
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amendments contained in the Exposure Draft are set to be finalized in early
2017.11

B.

MERGERS

During 2016, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
("ACCC") made thirty-one informal merger clearance decisions12 and
provided six "public competition assessments." Generally, such assessments
are made when a merger is rejected, but also may occur when an application
is approved subject to enforceable undertakings, or raises issues that the
ACCC considers in the public interest.1 The ACCC did not oppose any of
the six assessment applications, and only three were approved subject to
enforceable undertakings.14
On February 18, 2016, the ACCC announced it would no longer oppose
the acquisition of Covs Parts by GPF Asia Pacific Pty Ltd (GPC) from
Automotive Holdings Group Limited (AHG).15 Previously, in December
2015, the ACCC rejected GPC's original proposal, but accepted that a
revised version, made subject to the attachment of a section 87B enforceable
undertaking, would be unlikely to contravene section 50 of the CCA
(prohibiting acquisitions likely to have the effect of "substantially lessening
competition" in any market). Accordingly, the transaction was modified to
exclude store acquisitions in certain areas.
In the Australian Competition Tribunal, a total of eleven decisions were
delivered in 2016. Only one authorization application was made and
granted, namely, Sea Swift's proposed acquisition of Northern Territory and
far north Queensland marine freight business, Toll Marine Logistics
Australia. The Tribunal handed down this decision on July 1, 2016,
following the ACCC's opposition to an informal clearance application in
July 2015.16 The authorization, granted subject to conditions on "public
11. Scott Morrison, Delivering Strengthened Competition Law - Section 46 Legislation Introduced,
TREASURER
OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF AusrAuA (Dec. 1, 2016), http://
sjm.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/125-2016/.
12. AuSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM'N (ACCC), Public Competition
Assessments, http://registers.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtmUitemId/751043/year/2016
(last

visited Apr. 8, 2017).
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. ACCC, Public Competition Assessment: GPC Asia Pacific Pty Ltd - ProposedAcquisition of Covs
Parts From Automotive Holdings Group Limited (Mar. 23, 2016), http://registers.accc.gov.au/
content/index.phtmUitemId/501191.

&

16. Luke Woodward, Gina Cass-Gottlieb, Genevieve Rahman & Petria Lewis, Australian
Competition TribunalAuthorises Sea Swift's Acquisition of Toll's Marine FreightAssets, GILBERT
TOBIN INSIGHTs (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.gtlaw.com.au/australian-competition-tribunalauthorises-sea-swifts-acquisition-tolls-marine-freight-assets;
See also
AUSrADLAN
COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM'N, ACCC Opposes Sea Swift Pty Ltd's ProposedAcquisition of
Toll Marine Logistics, MR 118/15 (uly 9, 2015), https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/acccopposes-sea-swift-pty-ltd%E2%80%99s-proposed-acquisition-of-toll-marine-logistics.
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benefits" grounds, marked only the second Tribunal determination of a
merger authorization application since this avenue was introduced in 2007.17
C.

CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

In 2016, the ACCC also commenced proceedings against two global
shipping companies, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK) and Kawasaki
Kisen Kaise (K-Line), alleging cartel conduct in the transportation of
vehicles from Japan to Australia between 2009 and 2012.18 These are the
first two criminal proceedings brought pursuant to the criminal cartel
provisions introduced in 2009 under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010
(Cth). While NYK pled guilty to its charges on 18 July 2016,19 K-Line has
not yet entered any plea, receiving a first mention in court on 15 November
2016. Sentencing for NYK is scheduled for April 2017.
In February, the Federal Court also delivered its trial judgment in the
"Egg Cartel Case." This case involved allegations by the ACCC that the
Australian Egg Corporation Limited (AECL), as well as prominent egg
suppliers, Farm Pride and Twelve Oaks Poultry, engaged in cartel behaviour
to maintain high prices, and thwart oversupply of eggs in the market.20
Justice White of the Federal Court dismissed the case, ruling that, although
the defendants "intended" that members of the AECL would take action to
address the oversupply, there was no attempt to induce any agreement or
understanding involving culling hens or otherwise disposing of surplus eggs
(as was alleged).21 The ACCC subsequently appealed; judgment was
reserved at the time of writing.

D.

DOMINANCE

In April, $18.6 million in penalties were ordered against Cement Australia
Pty Ltd. and related companies for entering into anti-competitive "flyash"
17. Woodward, Cass-Gottlieb, Rahman & Lewis, supra note 16.

18. The Queen v Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha [2016] NSW (Austl.), http://www.australi
6

-nsd I143-nyk.html.

19. Elizabeth Avery, Chris Boyd, Gina Cass-Gottlieb, Steven Glass, Andrew Floro

&

ancompetitionlaw.org/cases/current/201

Stephanie Wee, Japanese Shipping Company NYK Pleads Guilty to Criminal Cartel Conduct in
Inaugural Australian Prosecution, GILBERT & TOBIN INSIG-TS (July 21, 2016), https://www
.gtlaw.com.au/insights/japanese-shipping-company-nyk-pleads-guilty-criminal-cartel-conductinaugural-australian-prosecution; Rebecca Thurlow, Japanese Shipping Company NYK Pleads
Guilty to Criminal-CartelConduct in Australia'sFederalCourt, WALL ST. J. July 17, 2016), https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/japanese-shipping-company-nyk-pleads-guilty-to-criminal-cartelconduct-in-australian-court- 1468810382?mg=id-wsj.

20. ACCC, ACCC Takes Action Following Alleged Egg Cartel Attempt (May 28, 2014), https://
www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-takes-action-following-alleged-egg-cartel-attempt.
21. Sarah Danckert, Judge Scrambles ACCC's Egg Cartel Case, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.smh.com.au/business/consumer-affairs/udge-scrambles-acccs-egg-

cartel-case-201602 10-gmqira.htmnl.
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agreements, in contravention of section 45 of the CCA.22 Justice
Greenwood, in the Federal Court of Australia, found that contracts entered
between the parties had the purpose and effect of preventing competitors
from entering the concrete market, and thus, of substantially lessening
competition.23 In this case, the ACCC also alleged that the same conduct
amounted to a misuse of market power under the current iteration of section
46 of the CCA. However, this claim was dismissed, as there was insufficient
evidence to show that the defendants were "taking advantage" of their
substantial market power. This was the only instance of alleged misuse of
market power in 2016.

III. Brazil
A.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

On 6 September 2016, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense
(CADE) published a new resolution establishing a deadline of thirty days to
complete the analysis of fast-track merger filings.24 Although the General
Superintendence of the agency previously observed the deadline informally,
the new provision provides for more legal certainty and predictability in the
timing of clearance. On October 18, 2016, CADE also approved a new
resolution regarding the notification of associative agreements, which are
commercial contracts-generally between competitions and vertically
related players-that require pre-merger notification in Brazil if certain
conditions are met.2 5 The great innovation of Resolution No. 17/2016 is the
removal of the vertical relationship threshold for notification, observed, for
instance, in supply and distribution agreements. It means that from
November 2016 on, only certain commercial agreements between
competitors will require antitrust clearance.
The third amendment on the regulation in 2016 relates to how CADE
defines the relevant business activities' revenues that will be used to calculate
fines. Resolution 3, in force since 2012, provides a list of activities
defendants should consider to calculate their revenues that will serve as basis
for fine calculation (fines resulting from convictions for anticompetitive
22. Media Release, ACCC, ACCC Appeals Cement Australia Level of Penalties (June 6, 2016),
https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-appeals-cement-australia-level-of-penaties.
23. Media Release, ACCC, $18.6 Million Penalties Ordered Against Cement Australia Companies
For Anti-Competitive Flash Agreements (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.accc.gov.aulmedia-release/
86
1 -million-penalties-ordered-against-cement-australia-companies-for-anti-competitiveflyash-agreements.

24. Resolugio No. 16, de 1 de Setembro de 2016, DiAiio OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
5.9.2016 (Braz.), http://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/institucional/pesquisa/documento-consulta-externa
.php?NMVKAaTPZCcA-E-x95flSHaQ8ki5cBEA8Q1NRGQF44sW-07QOWLpuBsOxNytVe-toJFAG_3jAljj5dQOyMpA.
25. ResoluqIo No. 17, de 18 de Outubro de 2016, D[Iluo OFICIAL DA UNIAo [D.O.U.] de
18.10.2016

(Braz.),

http://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/institucional/pesquisa/documento-

consulta-extern.php?ssjK4QTNM7ViqHpNE_48iLwuyZi8GbS8yOqA8QG-4hgSOtYmh59
AA8GGKDFAgD1vCoXBwp2SQL6YqZEwffSBQA.

https://scholar.smu.edu/yearinreview/vol51/iss1/5

6

Pino et al.: International Antitrust
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST

2017]

51

practices). CADE realized that because the existing definitions were too
broad, the resulting fines were not necessarily proportionate. The new rule
affords CADE more flexibility when applying Resolution 3, if they view fines
as disproportionate or unfair.
B.

MERGERS

On 30 March 2016, Fedex/TNT, the deal that created the largest global
delivery services company and faced strong opposition from the competitor
UPS, was unconditionally approved by CADE after a long review period
(161 days).26 CADE also approved the joint venture among broadcast TV
companies SBT, Record, and RedeTV.27
The new company will create and distribute TV content, channels, and
programs, as well as license the digital signal for pay-TV operators. As a
condition for clearance, parties agreed to behavioral remedies,28 including
committing to invest in content and subsidize small and medium operators.
CADE has also approved the acquisition of HSBC by Bradesco, subject to
a settlement of behavioral remedies, and also the acquisition of the sexual
well-being business by Reckitt Benckiser from Hypermarcas, conditioned to
the divestment of the K-Y brand of personal lubricants in Brazil.
C.

CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

In July 2015, following several other jurisdictions, CADE opened what is
internationally known as the "Forex investigation," related to the
manipulation of foreign exchange rates. The inquiry started based on a
29
Leniency Agreement.
In 2016, CADE opened five inquiries related to the so called "Car Wash
Operation," in addition to two proceedings that began in 2015.30 CADE's
General Superintendent has told the press that over 30 inquiries involving
the Car Wash Operation are currently under scrutiny. So far, only seven of
them have been made public. They involve public tenders related to:
onshore platforms; construction of a nuclear power plant ("Angra III") and
of a hydroelectric plant; railways; urbanization projects; large size buildings;
and soccer stadiums.
26. Ato de ConcentraqIo No. 08700.009559/2015-12, de 30
OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 5.4.2016 (Braz.).
27. Ato de ConcentraqIo No. 08700.006723/2015-21, de 22
OFIcIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 28.6.2016 (Braz.).
28. Ato de ConcentraqIo No. 08700.010790/2015-41, de 17
OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 20.6.2016 (Braz.).
29. Rocesso Administrativo No. 08700.004633/2015-04, de 1
OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 2.7.2015 (Braz.).

de marqo de 2016, DIARIO
de junho de 2016, DjARio
de junho de 2016, DImuo
de julho de 2015, DIAmo

30. See, e.g., CONSI o ADMImIsTrUVO DE DEFENSA EcONOMICA (CADE), Within the Scope
of the Car Wash Operation, CADE Investigates Another Cartel in Petrobas Puhlic Bids Leniency
Agreement (last updated Dec. 6, 2016 2:33 PM), http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/within-thescope-of-the-car-wash-operation-cade-investigates-another-cartel-in-petrobras-public-bids.
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Two important cartel convictions took place in February 2016: the
chemical company Solvay was fined BRL17.4 million for taking part in an
international cartel in the sodium-perborate market, which would have
affected the Brazilian market. The investigation was opened following a
leniency agreement signed between CADE and Evonik Degussa. The
second one relates to bid rigging in public tenders for laundry services in Rio
de Janeiro. The fines imposed totaled R$27.3 million. CADE has also
prohibited the company Brasil Sul Industria e Com6rcio-deemed the cartel
leader-from contracting with Government entities for the five year
period.31

D.

DOMINANCE

In February, CADE convicted three port operators (Tecon Salvador and
Tecon Rio Grande-both part of the Wilson Sons Group-and
Intermaritima Terminais) for imposing abusive port storage fees, applying
the combined fine of R$10.6 million.32
Also in 2015, CADE convicted Eli Lilly for the practice of sham litigation,
imposing a fine of R$36,679,586.16.33 CADE took the view that Eli Lilly
managed to sustain a monopoly of an active ingredient used in
pharmaceuticals for cancer treatments, by preventing the entry of
competitors and by means of numerous court actions in multiple
jurisdictions.
E.

COURT

DECISIONS

A lawsuit related to the merger between the chocolate companies Nestle
and Garoto, which lasted approximately eleven years, is finally about to end,
after an out of court settlement reached between CADE and the parties.
The merger took place in 2002 and was fully rejected by CADE in 2005,
when parties decided to challenge the decision in Court. CADE, Nestl6, and
Garoto agreed on late remedies to end judicial discussions (remedies agreed
were deemed confidential and have not been made public).34
31. CADE, Cade Condemns Bids for Hospital Laundries in Rio (last updated Mar.3, 2016 12:44
PM), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/
cade-condena-cartel-de-licitacoes-de-lavanderias-hospitalares-no-rio.
32. CADE, Cade Fine Portsof Salvador (BA) and Rio Grande (RS)

for Abuse

of Dominant Position

(last updated Apr. 18, 2016 3:12 PM), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:
http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/cade-multa-portos-de-salvador-ba-e-rio-grande-rs-por-abusode-posicao-dominante.

33. Processo Administrativo No. 08012.011508/2007-91, de 24 de junho de 2015, D[Amo
DA UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 30.6.2015 (Braz.).

OvicIA

34. Eric Kroh, Nestle Reaches Deal with Brazil to Complete Garoto Buy, LAw360.com (Oct. 5,
2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/84851 1/nesde-reaches-deal-with-brazil-to-completegaroto-buy.
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Canada35
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In September 2016, the federal government introduced Bill C-25,36 which,
when passed, will amend the affiliation rules in the Competition Act (Act)37
to treat partnerships, trusts, sole proprietorships, and non-incorporated
business entities similarly to how corporations are treated.
The Competition Bureau (Bureau) also released new Intellectual Property
Enforcement Guidelines, providing guidance regarding the Bureau's
enforcement approach to product switching, patent assertion entities, patent
38
settlements, and standard essential patents.

B.

MERGERS

Several high profile transactions cleared in 2016 without remedies.39
Following abandonment by the parties, the Bureau withdrew its challenge of
Staples' proposed acquisition of Office Depot4o and cleared Superior Plus'
acquisition of Canexus based on efficiencies.41
35. The section on Canada was authored by Adam S. Goodman, Dentons Canada LLP.
36. An Act to Amend the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Canada Cooperatives Act,
the Canada Not-For-Profits Corporation Act and the Competition Act, Bill C-25, 1st Sess.,

42nd Parl. (2015-2016) (Can.).
37. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 (Can.).
38. COMPETITION BunrAu CANADA (CCB), Enforcement Guidelines: Intellectual Property (Mar.
31, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cb-IPEG-e.pdf/$file/

cb-IPEG-e.pdf.
39. See CCB, Competition Bureau Backgrounder Regarding the Proposed Acquisition by Shaw of
4027
.html;
WIND (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/0
by
Acquisition
Proposed
Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding the
Lowe's of RONA (May 12, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.caleic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/
04085.html; Press Release, CCB, Competition Bureau Satisfied That Proposed Sale of St-Hubert
Will Not Limit Consumer Choice (May 18, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.caleic/site/
cb-bc.nsf/eng/04089.html; Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding
Anheuser-Busch InBev's Proposed Acquisition of SABMiller and the Concurrent Divestiture of Certain
Miller Brands to Molson Coors (May 31, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cbbc.nsf/eng/04097.html; Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding the
Proposed Amalgamation of Modular Space Corporation and Williams Scotsman International, Inc.
7
Oune 23, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/0410 .html; Press
Lakes Power
Great
of
Acquisition
One's
Hydro
Oppose
Release, CCB, Competition Bureau Does Not
(uly 8, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04115.html.
40. Press Release, CCB, Competition Bureau Withdrawing its Court Challenge of Staples'
Acquisition of Office Depot (May 19, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-

bc.nsf/eng/04080.html.
41. The efficiencies defence was established in Canada notwithstanding a challenge by the
FTC in the United States and the subsequent abandonment of the transaction by the parties.
See Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding Superior's Proposed
Acquisition of Canexus (June 28, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/

eng/0 4 l 1 .html.
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The Bureau obtained six gas station divestitures from Parkland regarding
its acquisition of Pioneer;42 six local divestitures from Iron Mountain
regarding its acquisition of Recall;43 two pharmaceutical product divestitures
from Teva regarding its acquisition of Allergan;44 three location/asset
divestitures from Crop Production Services (CPS) regarding its acquisition
of WendlandAg;45 four location divestitures from CPS again regarding its
acquisition of Andrukow Group Solutions;46 two gas station/supply
agreement divestitures from Harnois regarding its acquisition of Therrien's
gasoline supply agreements; 47 and two gas station divestitures from CoucheTard regarding its acquisition of gas stations from Imperial Oil.48

C.

CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

2016 saw further guilty pleas related to the Quebec construction industry,
related to bid-rigging for sewer services,49 as well as to bid-rigging for a
private ventilation contract.50
Concerning the ongoing auto parts investigation, Shinowa was fined $13
million by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for bid-rigging related to
42. Press Release, CCB, Competition Bureau and Parkland Reach Mediated Resolution That
Will See Gas Stations and Assets Sold in Ontario and Manitoba (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www
.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04049.html; Commissioner of Competition v.

Parkland Industries Ltd. and Parkland Fuel Corp. (2016), Consent Agreement, Comp. Trib.,
File No. CT-2015-003 (Can.), http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CMFiles/CT-2015-003_Registered%20
Consent%20Agreement_1 13383-29-20162824.pdf.
43. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding Iron Mountain's
Acquisition of Recall (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/
eng/04055.html.
44. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding Teva's Acquisition of
Allergan's Generic PharmaceuticalsBusiness (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/
eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04065.hunl.
45. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding the Acquisition of
WendlandAg's Agri-product Retail Locations by CPS (May 2, 2016), http://www
.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04070.html.
46. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding CPS' ProposedAcquisition
ofAndrukow (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04135
.html.
47. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding Le Groupe HarnoisInc.'s
ProposedAcquisition of Distributions Petrolieres Therrien Inc.'s Gasoline Supply Arrangements (June
23, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04106.htnl.
48. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding Couche-Tard's Proposed
Acquisition of Retail Gasoline Sites from Imperial Oil (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www
.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/0413 7.html.
49. Press Release, CCB, Quebec Company Fined $118,000 For Participating in Sewer
Services Cartel (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/
04028.html.
50. Press Release, CCB, Bid-Rigging Scheme Leads to $140,000 Fines for Quebec Company
and its President (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.caleic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/
04042.html.
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electronic power steering gears. 5' Nishikawa Rubber pled guilty and was
fined USD $130 million in the United States related to sales in both Canada
and the

D.

US.52

ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

In April 2016, the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) found that the
Toronto Real Estate Board (TREB) had engaged in abuse of dominance by
restricting access to and use of proprietary Multiple Listing Service data,
adversely affecting innovation, quality, and range of real estate brokerage
services in Toronto.53 Although TREB did not itself compete in the
adversely affected market,54 the Tribunal found that it had a "plausible
competitive interest" in protecting some of its members from new entrants
in that market.ss Following this decision, the Bureau commenced an
application against the Vancouver Airport Authority for restricting access for
the supply of in-flight catering at Vancouver International Airport, another
56
market in which the alleged dominant firm did not compete.
In 2016, the Bureau closed its investigation into Google's online search
services 57 and TMX Group's restrictions on market data.58
E.

COURT

DECISIONS

In 2015, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the "discoverability"
principle59 applied to private actions for damages based on the breach of the
cartel conspiracy provisions of the Act, potentially extending the time to
51. Press Release, CCB, Japanese Auto Parts Company Fined $13 Million for Participating in
a Bid-Rigging Conspiracy (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-

bc.nsf/eng/04058.html.
52. Press Release, CCB, Unprecedented Cooperation with US Antitrust Enforcement
Authority Leads to Major Cartel Crackdown Guly 20, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.
gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04122.htnl.
53. Commissioner of Competition v. Toronto Real Estate Board, 2016 Comp. Trib. 7, para. 2,

3, 4 (Can.).
54. Id. 11.
55. Id. 9] 279-80.
56. Press Release, CCB, Competition Bureau Takes Action Against Vancouver Airport
44
Authority (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/041
.html.
57. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding its Investigation into
Alleged Anti-Competitive Conduct by Google (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.cal
eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04066.html.
58. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding its Investigation into

Alleged Anti-Competitive Conduct by

TMX Group Limited (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www

.competitionbureau.gc.caleic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04157.html.
59. The discovery principle is a common law rule which provides that a limitation period
begins to run not necessarily from the defendant's conduct but from when "the material facts on
which [the claim] is based are have been discovered or ought to have been discovered by the
plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable diligence." See Fanshawe College of Applied Arts and

Technology v. AU Optronics Corporation, et al., 2016 ONCA 621, para. 32 (Can.).
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advance claims.60 In the same case, the court also ruled that the statutory
cause of action in the Act did not foreclose the ability of the plaintiff to claim
damages pursuant to tort law.61
In certifying the cathode ray tube class action, the Ontario Superior Court
of Justice held that "umbrella" purchasers (who purchased alleged cartelized
products from non-defendants) had valid causes of action against the named
defendants pursuant to restitutionary law.62

V.

China63

A.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In 2016, the Draft Amendment of the PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law
(the law hereinafter the "AUCL", the draft amendment hereinafter the
"Draft Amendment") passed State Council review and is anticipated to be
adopted as law during 2017.64 Notably, the Draft Amendment introduces
two controversial new unfair competition behaviors, i.e., abuse of superior
market position and unfair competition involving the internet.

B.

MERGERS

In the first three quarters of 2016, the Ministry of Commerce
("MOFCOM") unconditionally cleared 259 merger cases,65 including 197
cases under its simple case procedure.66 Most cases under the simplified
procedure were cleared within phase I of the statutory review period.
In 2016, MOFCOM imposed conditions only on one merger case, while
also lifting conditions previously imposed in another case. In SABMiller/
Anheuser-Busch InBev, MOFCOM required that SABMiller divest its 49%
interest in China Resources Snow Breweries to its JV partner.67 This is the
first MOFCOM published decision distinguishing relevant product markets
60. See id.
61. See id. [ 85.
62. Fanshawe College v. Hitachi, Ltd. et al., 2016 ONSC 5118, paras. 46-47 (Can. Ont. Sup.
Ct. J.).
63. This section on China was authored by Peter Wang & Yizhe Zhang, China.
64. See (
M
IE
(
-iT)) [Draft Amendment of PRC Anti-

Unfair Competition Law] (promulgated by State Council Legis. Office, Feb. 25, 2016) (China).
65. The List of Concentration Cases Approved by the Operators in the First Quarter of 2016,
MOFCOM (Apr. 6, 2016 3:51 PM), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201604/
20160401290524.shtml; The List of Concentration Cases Approved by the Operators in the Second
Quarter of 2016, MOFCOM Guly 5, 2016 2:16 PM), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/
201607/20160701353023.shtml; The List of Concentration Cases Approved by the Operators in the
Third Quarterof2016, MOFCOM (Oct. 10, 2016 8:48 AM), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/
zcfb/201610/20161001405824.shtml.
66. Operators Focused on Simple Cases, MOFCOM (last visited Apr. 15, 2017), http://
fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/yzjzjyajgs/.
67. See Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 38 of'2016, MOFCOM July 29, 2016 6:21
PM), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201607/20160701369044.shtml.
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based on mass versus mid-to-high-end brands and defining geographic
markets according to individual Chinese provinces rather than as Chinawide.
MOFCOM published three penalty decisions for transactions that were
68
not properly notified. Two of those cases involved joint ventures, while the
third involved gun-jumping in a two-step acquisition.69 In all three cases,
MOFCOM found that the unnotified transactions did not give rise to
competition concerns, and thus only imposed fines and did not require
reversal of the transactions.
C.

CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETTIVE PRACTICES

In 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission ("NDRC"),
the antitrust authority responsible for price-related conduct violations,
issued large fines in several high-profile cases, including: (1) a fine of RMB
12 million against Haier for restricting the minimum resale price, in a case
where the NDRC explicitly cited as evidence screenshots of text and chat
messages contained on employees' personal devices;70 (2) a fine of RMB 2.96
million against five natural gas suppliers, including two subsidiaries of China
National Petroleum Corp., for abusing their dominant positions in the
construction of non-residential natural gas networks in local markets;7' (3) a
fine of RMB 1,686,900 against Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical and a
fine of RMB 118,300 against Chongqing Datong Pharmaceutical for price
fixing and market division,72 where the NDRC regarded the two affiliated
companies as single economic entity due to their common largest
shareholder and common sales manager.
The State Administration of Industry and Commerce ("SAIC"), the
antitrust authority responsible for non-price-related conduct violations,
fined Tetra Pak RMB 667.7 million for abuse of dominant market position.
68. See Ministry of Commerce Administrative Penalty Decision (Commercial Law [2016] No. 174,

MOFCOM

(May

4,

2016

2:15

PM),

http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201605/

2016050131108 1.shtml; Ministry of Commerce Administrative Penalty Decision (Commercial Law

[2016] No. 175, MOFCOM (May 4, 2016 2:11 PM), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/
201605/20160501311092.shtml.
69. See Ministry of Commerce Administrative Penalty Determination Letter (Commercial Law

[2016] No. 173, MOFCOM (May 4, 2016 2:03 PM), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/
201605/20160501311079.shtnl.
70. See Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Price Administration on the Decision on the Administrative
Penalty (Chongqing, Japan and Japan Daily Necessities Sales Co., Ltd. Shanghai Branch, and Three

.

Other Companies, NAT'i. DEv. & REFORM COMM'N (Aug. 12, 2016 10:21 AM), http://www
.shdrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jggl/jghzcfjds/24137.htm?sukey=3997cO719fl51520d9d8ab22467f976c
92 570
98c4d515fe7612d065f5b252164f77246e2681dc3fe38a088feeff499b4
71. See Press Release, NDRC, Hubei Provincial Price Bureau on the Five Natural Gas
Company Price Monopoly Punishment (July 12, 2016), http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/

201607/t20160712_811004.html.
72. See Decision of the National Development and Reform Commission on Administrative Punishment
[2016] No. 1, NAT'L DEv. & REFORM COMM'N (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/

jgjdyfld/fgld/201602/t20160202_774116.html.
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This is the highest fine imposed by SAIC to date, representing 7 percent of
Tetra Pak's relevant sales in China during 2011. The accused conduct
included incentives that Tetra Pak employed-performance testing,
warranty limitations, accumulative volume discounts, and customized
purchase requirements-to encourage customers owning or leasing Tetra
Pak packaging equipment to also purchase Tetra Pak's packaging materials
and aftermarket services.73
D.

COURT

DECISIONS

As of November 28, 2016, courts nationwide had published 611 unfair
competition and antitrust decisions, fifteen of which were issued under the
Anti-Monopoly Law ("AML").74
In Yingding v. Sinopec, plaintiff Yunnan Yingding Bio-energy, a privatelyowned bioenergy manufacturer, alleged that Sinopec, a major stated-owned
oil company, and its Yunnan branch abused their dominant market position
by refusing to incorporate plaintiffs biofuel into Sinopec's distribution
system without justification. In 2014, the Kunming Intermediate People's
Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. In 2015, the Yunnan High People's
Court reversed the first-instance decision and remanded the case. 75 In 2016,
the Kunming Intermediate People's Court rejected all the plaintiffs claims,
finding no abuse of dominance on the grounds that (1) although the
defendants had a duty to purchase biofuel from the plaintiff under the
energy laws, the lack of implementing rules regarding the sales amount,
price, and methods had rendered the defendants practically unable to
establish a transactional relationship with the plaintiff, so defendants did not
violate such duty by refusing to do so because their refusal to deal was due to
objective reasons; and (2) there was no competition relationship between the
parties regarding the sales of biofuel so the defendants' conduct did not give
rise to negative effect on competition.76
Junwei TIAN vs. Abbott is the first follow-on antitrust civil litigation filed
by a consumer following an earlier NDRC decision against baby formula
manufacturers including Abbott. The Beijing High People's Court ruled
that the NDRC decision did not identify Carrefour as the other party that
agreed with Abbott to implement resale price maintenance, and thus the
plaintiff failed to prove the existence of an anticompetitive agreement
73. See State Administrationfor Industry and Commerce Administrative Penalty Decision (Industrial

and Commercial Case [2016] No. 1), SAIC (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/
jzzf/20161 1/t20161116_172375.htnl.
74. See CHINA REFERENCE DocUMENTs NETWORK, http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/.

%

75. See Yingding v. Sinopec (Yunnan Higher People's Ct. Aug. 13, 2015) (China), available at
http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/pfnl_1970324845016952.htrnl?keywords=%E4%BA%91 %E5
8D%97%E7%9B%88%E9%BC%8E&match=Exact&tiao=1.
76. See Yunnan Trench Oil Biodiesel PrivateEnterprisesin the PetrochemicalRefusal to Resume Trial
Will StillAppeal, XmI UA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 26, 2016 4:50 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/
legal/2016-11/02/c 1119837390.htm.
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between Abbott and Carrefour.77 Therefore, the plaintiff did not establish
that he suffered loss from his purchase of Abbott product at Carrefour as a
result of Abbott's violation of the AML.

VI.
A.

European Union8
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Aside from facing the unprecedented challenge of handling the UK's
Brexit vote, the European Commission (EC) has continued other policy
efforts this year. It released the preliminary results of its sector inquiry into
online commerce and digital markets, finding that obstacles remain to
achieving a borderless EU-wide marketplace and signaling the potential for
follow-up enforcement.79 The EC also encouraged national governments to
speed up efforts to bring their legal systems in line with EU principles
before the end of the year, to further facilitate antitrust damage litigation.so

B.

MERGERS8I

The ongoing wave of telecom transactions has continued to attract close
scrutiny after the EC blocked Hutchison's proposed acquisition of
Telefonica UK, a decision which Hutchison is challenging before the EU
courts. The EC cleared the proposed Italian joint venture between
Vimpelcom and Hutchinson, as well as Belgian operator Telenet's takeover
of BASE, but only after in-depth investigations and securing fix-it-first
divestments to allow for the creation of new market operators. The deals
also further fueled the broader political debate on pan-European telecom
integration.
Consolidation in the agrochemical space has equally triggered mounting
attention as the EC opened an in-depth investigation into ChemChina's
planned takeover of Syngenta and twice prolonged its ongoing review of the
planned Dow-Dupont merger.
77. See Junwei TIAN v. Abbott (Beijing Higher People's Ct. Nov. 4, 2016) (China), available
2
7
at http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/content/content?DocID= ad 34f9-cfdc-453a-ae0aa8f22dc22004.
78. The section on the European Union was authored by Laurie-Anne Grelier & Peter
Camesasca, Covington & Burling.
79. Margrethe Vestager, Comm'r, E-commerce: A FairDealfor Consumers Online, Speech at the
Stakeholder Conference on Preliminary Findings of the E-commerce Sector Inquiry (Oct. 6,
2
2016), available at https:/ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/ 014-2019/vestager/an
nouncements/e-commerce-fair-deal-consumers-online-en.
80. Margrethe Vestager, Comm'r, Defending Competition throughout the EU, Speech at the Eur.
Competition Day (Nov. 23, 2016), availableat https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/
2014-2019/vestager/announcements/defending-competition-throughout-eu en.
81. See Merger Cases, Eur. Comm'n, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/ (listing
merger cases starting from Sept. 21, 1990).
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ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES

Cartel fine levels broke new records as the EC imposed fines totaling 2.9
billion (approximately US$3.2 billion) against five companies allegedly
involved in the Trucks cartel case, the largest amount fined in a single case.
The EC has issued three other cartel decisions thus far in 2016, levying fines
totaling nearly _150 million (approximately US$167 million).82
The EC also issued its first decision on the controversial issue of price
signaling since the Wood Pulp setback more than 20 years ago. It accepted
commitments from 14 container shipping carriers to modify their public
price announcements, and closed its investigation without making any
infringement determination.83
D.

ABUSES OF A

DOMINANT

POSITION

Continuing investigations against Google that it commenced in 2010, the
EC supplemented its initial charges against the technology company by
forming a preliminary conclusion that Google had favoured its own internet
comparison shopping products in search result pages. The EC also issued
new charges targeting the company's practices towards third parties in
online search advertising84
E.

COURT

DECISIONS

In the first EU judgment on reverse-payment patent settlements, the
General Court (GC) upheld the EC's 146 million fine (approximately
US$162 million) against Lundbeck and four generic producers for
agreements allegedly aimed at delaying generic entry for citalopram. The
GC found that the agreements amounted to market sharing between rivals,
such that the EC did not need to demonstrate that they adversely affected
competition.5

The EU's highest court, the Court of Justice, clarified in FM Remonts the
conditions under which companies can be accountable for their independent
agents' anticompetitive actions. 86 It also gave guidance in Eturas to assess
82. Press Release, Comm'r Vestager, Statement by Commissioner Vestager on decision to fine
truck producers _2.93 billion for participating in a cartel (Jul. 19, 2016), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release STATEMENT-16-2585_en.htm.
83. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments by container
liner shipping companies on price transparency (ul. 7, 2016), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-releaseIP-16-2446_en.htm.
84. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission takes further steps in investigations
alleging Google's comparison shopping and advertising-related practices breach EU rules Jul.
14, 2016), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-16-2532_en.htm.

85. Case T-472/13, H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd. v. Comm'n, EU:T:2016:449,
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsftext=&docid=1831

4

8&pageln

dex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=389862.
86. Case C-542/14, SIA 'VM Remonts', formerly SIA 'DIV un KO' and SIA 'Ausma grupa', v.
Konkurences padome, and Konkurences padome, v. SIA 'Pirtikas kompinija', EU:C:2016:578,
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competitor coordination through online platforms and the platform
provider's facilitator role.87

VII.
A.

Indias
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

This year witnessed a number of measures to further liberalize merger
provisions. The Government extended the target based de minimis
exemption from filing for acquisitions, while also increasing the thresholds.
The regular merger notification thresholds contained in the Competition Act
were also enhanced substantially. The Government additionally exempted
groups exercising less than 50% of voting rights from the application of
section 5 of the Competition Act.89 The Competition Commission of India
(CCI) amended its merger regulations to clarify the conditions for the.
exemption from filing for minority acquisitions, provide parties a right of
hearing before invalidation of a filing, further ease the filing process, and
clarify the trigger document for filing in the absence of a binding
agreement. 90

B.

CARTELS AND OTHER AGREEMENTS

After the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) set aside fines
imposed by the CCI on cement companies on procedural grounds last year,
the CCI re-heard the parties and issued a fresh decision. This decision
imposed penalties of USD 1 billion on ten cement companies and their trade
association for indulging in price-fixing and sharing of commercially
sensitive information.91 Trade associations continued to be on the CCI's
radar as it imposed penalties for controlling entry into the market on a
chemist and druggist association in Karnataka. Lupin, a pharmaceutical
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jstext=&docid=181950&pageln
dex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=397904.
87. Case C-74/14, 'Eturas' UAB and Others v. Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba,
EU:C:2016:42, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jstext=&docid=
173680&pagelndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=st&dir=&occ=first&part=l&cid=447079.
88. The section on India was authored by Vinod Dhall and Mansi Tewari.
89. Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2016, Gazette of India, pt. II sec. 3(ii) (Mar. 4, 2016), http:/
206 73
%28E%29-674%28E%29-675%28
/www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/notification/SO%
E%29.pdf.
90. The Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business
relating to combinations) Amendment Regulations, 2016, Gazette of India, pt. m sec. 4 (Jan. 7,
67506
.pdf
2016), http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/regulationpdf/1
91. In re: Alleged Cartelisation by Cement Manufacturers (2016) RTPE No. 52 of 2006,
2
MRTP Comm'n, available at http://cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/5 2006_1.pdf.
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company was also penalized in this case for entering into an anti-competitive
agreement with the association. 92
C.

MERGERS

The CCI imposed a hybrid remedies package as a condition for approval
of PVR's proposed acquisition of multiplex/single screen cinema halls from
DT Cinemas. Apart from directing the parties to exclude certain assets from
the scope of the deal, the CCI imposed commitments on the parties,
including an undertaking not to expand in the affected relevant markets for
five years, modification of the non-compete clause, and removal of a right of
first offer to PVR for the seller's future projects.93

D.

DOMINANCE

The CCI initiated an investigation against the Gas Authority of India
Limited for alleged abuse of dominance by imposing one-sided and
discriminatory terms in its dealings with customers. 94
E.

COURT

DECISIONS

The Delhi High Court brought much needed clarity on the issue of
interaction between patent law and competition law by ruling that the CCI
has jurisdiction to investigate cases of abuse of dominance by standard
essential patent holders. It also noted that although the two overlap to some
extent, there is no irreconcilable conflict between patent law and
competition law in India.95
The CCI suffered setbacks when the COMPAT set aside several of its
decisions, both on procedural and substantive grounds. The CCI's penalty
of USD 258 million imposed on Coal India for abuse of dominance was set
aside on due process grounds, as a few members of the CCI who signed the
order were not present during the hearings. COMPAT also set aside the
92. M/s Maruti & Company v. Karnataka Chemists & Druggists Association and Others

(2016) Case No. 71 of 2013, Competition Comm'n of India, at 38, 43-44, available at http://
www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/712013.pdf.

93. Notice under Section 6(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 given by PVR Ltd., 2016, C2015/07/288,

at 5-6 of Appendix-A,

available at http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/

Notice order document/C-2015-07-288.pdf.
94. In Re: Rico Auto Industries Limited, In Re: Omax Autos Limited, In Re: Omax Autos
Limited, In Re: Rico Auto Industries Limited, In Re: Rico Castings Limited v. GAIL (India)
Limited (2016) Cases No. 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of 2016, Competition Comm'n of India, at 4,
13-14, available at http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/Case%2016-20_2016%20S%2026
%281%29%2003102016.pdf.
95. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) v. Competition Comm'n of India and Another,
W.P.(C) 464/2014 & CM Nos.911/2014 & 915/2014, at 129-30, 161, High Ct. of Delhi (Mar.
30. 2016), http://obis.nic.in/ddir/dhc/VIB/judgement/30-03-2016/VIB30032016CW4642014
.pdf.
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penalties on Sanofi and GlaxoSmithKline for alleged bid rigging, due to the
lack of sufficient evidence.96
VIII.

A.

Japan97

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In May, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) amended the
"Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices Under
the Antimonopoly Act" to broaden the scope of conduct that falls within the
"safe harbor"98 of the Guidelines. According to the new guidelines, some
types of non-price related restrictions on distributors (such as restrictions on
selling competitive products and area of distribution) will not be illegal if
they are imposed by a business entity which is a new entrant in the market or
which has a market share of 20% or less.99

B.

MERGERS

In 2016, the JFTC cleared two cases after Phase II review without
conditions: the acquisition of shares by Osaka Steel in Tokyo Kohtetsu, and
the business alliance between Nippon Paper Industries and Tokushu Tokai
Paper.oo Several other Phase II cases, including the contemplated business
integration between JX Group and Tonen General Group,ol are still
pending as of the date of this writing.
96. Competition Appellate Tribunal New Delhi, In the Matter of GlaxoSmithKline
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Competition Comm'n of Ind., Bio-Med (P) Ltd., Sanofi Pasteur Ind.
Private Ltd., & Director General (Stores), Medical Store Depot, Ministry of Health and Family

/

Welfare, Appeal No. 85/2015 at 144-46 (Nov. 8, 2016), available at http://compat.nic.in/
Judgements.aspx.
97. The section on Japan was authored by Shigeyoshi Ezaki, Anderson Mori & Tomotsune.
98. Prior to the amendment, the safe harbor was a market share of less than 10% and ranking
lower than 4th place in the relevant market. See Jones Day, Partial Amendments to the
"Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices Under the Antimonopoly Act",
4
JAPAN LEGAL UPDATE, July 2016, vol. 16, http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/4 cb3
2
f87f-5e37-448e-b2d0- 17f048aaf296/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/40b908ba-be8f- a 12 20 6
a8f5-3149cc2de755/Japan%2OLegal%2OUpdate%20July% 0 1 .pdf.
99. Press Release, Secretary General of the Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, Guidelines Concerning
Distribution Systems and Business Practices Under the Antimonopoly Act, at 34 (May 27,
2
2016), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly- 016/May/160527.files/
160527_2.pdf.
100. See Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, The JFTC Reviewed the Proposed
Acquisition of Shares of Tokyo Kohtetsu Co., Ltd. by Osaka Steel Co., Ltd. (Jan. 28, 2016),
available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2016/January/160128.html; See also
Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, The JFTC Reviewed the Proposed Transactions
including Establishment of Joint Selling Company for Containerboards etc by Nippon Paper
Industries Co., Ltd. and Tokushu Tokai Paper.
2
6
Co., Ltd. (Mar. 18, 2016), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly- 01
March/1603 18.html.
101. Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, The JFTC Opens Secondary Review
Concerning the Proposed Business Integration Between JX Group and TonenGeneral group
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In June, the JFTC made an unusual statement on Canon's acquisition of
share options in Toshiba Medical Systems, stating that the acquisition was
part of an entire acquisition scheme. As Canon failed to notify the JFTC of
the acquisition, the JFTC considered that such activity could lead to a
possible violation of the Antimonopoly Act. Though the JFTC decided not to
impose a penalty in this case, it issued a caution to Canon and warned
companies to notify the JFTC prior to entering similar transactions.102
C.

CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

In March, the JFTC imposed administrative fines of approximately JPY
6.7 billion to five out of seven manufacturers of aluminum and tantalum
electrolytic capacitor products that were investigated for cartel conduct.03
This is the only decision JFTC issued in 2016 that involved an international
cartel.
In November, the JFTC made an announcement that the conduct of
One-Blue LLC, a patent pool of standard essential patents (SEPs) relating to
Blu-ray discs, constituted an unfair trade practice under the Antimonopoly
Act.104 According to the JFTC, One-Blue, whose patent holders declared
that they will license the SEPs on FRAND terms but were not able to reach
a license-fee agreement with Imation (a manufacturer of Blu-ray discs),
unlawfully interfered in the transactions between Imation and its distributors
in Japan. One-Blue's conduct involved sending letters to these distributors,
warning that the patent holders had a right to demand an injunction against
them. The JFTC, however, merely made the above announcement and did
not issue an order against One-Blue, as it had discontinued the conduct in
question.
D.

COURT DECISIONS

In January, the Tokyo Appellate Court rejected an appeal from Samsung
SDI (Malaysia) Bhd. in a cartel case relating to the production and sale of
television cathode-ray tubes (CRTs) by foreign companies such as
Samsung.105 Samsung disputed the JFTC's ability to apply the Antimonopoly
and Solicits Comments from Third Parties (Mar. 30, 2016), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/
en/pressreleases/yearly-2016/March/160330.html.
102. Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, Regarding the proposed acquisition of shares of
Toshiba Medical Systems Corporation by Canon Inc. (Jun. 30, 2016), available at http://www
.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2016/June/160630.html.
103. Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, The JFTC Issues Cease and Desist Orders and
Surcharge Payment Orders to the Manufacturers Selling Aluminum Electrolytic Capacitor and
Tantalum Electrolytic Capacitor (Mar. 29, 2016), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/
pressreleases/yearly-2016/March/160329.html.
104. Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, Closing the investigation on the suspected

violation by One-Blue, LLC of the Antimonopoly Act (Nov. 18, 2016), availableat http://www
.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2016/November/161118.html.

105. In 2009 and 2010, the JFTC ordered administrative fines of approximately JPY 4.2 billion
against six CRT manufacturers that were involved in a cartel conduct to manipulate the prices
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Act to foreign companies.1o6 The Tokyo Appellate Court ruled that the
Antimonopoly Act was applicable because the cartel was targeting the Japanese
television manufacturers who were the main purchasers of the CRTs.107
IX.

A.

Koreao8
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

During 2016, the Korea Fair Trade (KFTC) made a series of amendments
to the leniency regime in cartel investigations. As part of these changes, on
March 29, 2016, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law (FTL) was
amended to introduce a new provision that denied leniency benefits to an
applicant that had previously benefitted from the program in the last five
years. 09 Effective April 15, 2016, the KFTC further amended the regime to
require officers or employees of the applicant to attend the KFTC hearing
and imposed non-disclosure obligations.
On July 26, 2016, the KFTC proposed to amend the Fair Transactions in
Franchise Business Act to, among other things, toll the statute of limitations
on claims that may be brought before judicial courts while mediation is
pending.110
B.

MERGERS

In 2016, the KFTC remained active and continued to strengthen its
review of global mergers and acquisitions. During the first half of 2016,
KFTC reviewed a total of 272 business combination filings totalling KRW

&

of CRTs. This was the first time the JFTC ordered fines against foreign companies. These
orders were upheld at the subsequent hearing procedures of the JFTC. See Josh Gottlieb,
Appeals againstJFTCfinesforforeign CRT cartelgo down the tube, LEXOLOGY, June 8, 2015, http:/
922
4
b-acl38e694flf.
/www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=67a9b94c-cd0b- 50bapproximately JPY 4.2 billion
of
106. In 2009 and 2010, the JFTC ordered administrative fines
against six CRT manufacturers that were involved in a cartel conduct to manipulate the prices
of CRTs. This was the first time the JFTC ordered fines against foreign companies. These
orders were upheld at the subsequent hearing procedures of the JFTC. See Josh Gottlieb,
Appeals againstJFTCfnesforforeign CRT cartel go down the tube, LEXOLOGY, June 8, 2015, http:/
6 94
flf.
/www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=67a9b94c-cdOb-450b-922b-acl38e
found in JFTC's
is
decision
Court
Appellate
Tokyo
107. The summary of the Jan. 29, 2016
Feb. 9, 2016 issue, availableat LEX/DB L07120373, http://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/merumaga/
backnumber/2016/160209.html.
108. The section on Korea was authored by Youngjin Jung & Gina Jeehyun Choi, Kim
Chang.
109. See KFTC Press Release on Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law, 28 April 2016,
http://www.ftc.go.kr/policy/legi/legiView.jsp?lgslt notino=218
available at
&type-cd=&currpage=4&searchKey=&searchVal=&search start date=&search-end date.
110. See KFTC Press Release on Fair Transactions in Franchise Business Act, 26 July 2016,
http://www.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/reportboView.jsp?reportdata
at
available
no=6864&tribu-type-cd=&report data-divdcd=&currpage=1 &searchKey=&searchVal=
71 -J. &stdate=&enddate=.
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266 trillion, of which 63 combinations (aggregate value of KRW 253 trillion)
involved an overseas entity.-'
The KFTC, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Justice and
MOFCOM also probed into the proposed merger of Lam Research Corp.
("Lam") and KLA-Tencor Corp. ("KLA-Tencor"). After nearly ten months,
Lam and KLA-Tencor formally withdrew their application for approval of
the business combination and called off the merger." 2
In November of 2016, the KFTC imposed a corrective order regarding
the asset swap deal between Boehringer Ingelheim International GmbH and
Sanofi SA and ordered one of the companies to sell off its assets in Korea
related to certain pet pharmaceutical products.''3
C.

CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

In March 2016, the KFTC imposed a KRW 59 million fine against two
financial institutions in Korea for colluding on foreign exchange swap
bids.' 14 This was the first time the KFT'C imposed a fine against banks for
colluding in the foreign exchange market.
In April 2016, the KFTC imposed a combined fine of KRW 351.6 billion
against thirteen construction companies, including Samsung C&T and
Hyundai Engineering & Construction, for bid rigging projects to construct
liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanks.n5

D.

DOMINANCE

In February 2016, the KFTC imposed a fine of KRW 3.2 billion against
Incheon International Airport Corp. ("Incheon Airport") for abusing its
-

111. See Press Release, KFTC, 2016vd A'1 171 71 oj
%%g [Trend of Business Combination
1H 2016] (Sept. 13, 2016), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/
reportboView.jsp?report-data no=6927&tribu-type-cd=&report-data-div cd=&currpage=1&
searchKey=3&searchVal=71 -j A4J&stdate=&enddate=.
112. See Press Release, KFTC, Ail711 2, 5!-] i
1 211&%j1
4J]4I1V ,1 [The
Withdrawal of LAM Research-KLA Tencor Merger] (Oct. 7, 2016), available at http://www
.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/reportboView.jsp?
reportdata no=6964&tribu-type-cd=&report-data-div cd=&currpage=8&searchKey=&
searchVal=&stdate=&enddate=.
113. See Press Release, KFTC, -i11]A4 4 71 4%-11 ^
] [The Boehringer
Ingelheim International Gmbfl-Sanofi Merger] (Nov. 23, 2016), available at http://www
.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/reportboView.
jsp?report-data-no=7060&tribu-type cd=&report datadivcd=&currpage=l&searchKey=3&
searchVal=A} ,:v&stdate=&enddate=.
114. See Press Release, KFTC,
5 i 91
1
2117 A]}@4}
t-- -!i
V [Foreign
Exchange Swap Bid] (Mar. 15, 2016), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/
reportboView.jsp?report_datano=6615&tributype-cd=&report data div
cd=&currpage=32&searchKey=&searchVal=&stdate=&enddate.
115. See Press Release, KFTC, t 71-:L -"5LNG
A^JEYHE
.^4
Oi -1%% 13711} 1-d
[Korea Gas Corporation LNG Tank Bid Rigging Case] (Apr. 26, 2016), availableat http://www
.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/reportboView.jsp?report data no=6701&tribu-type-cd=&
report data div cd=&currpage=26&searchKey=&searchVal=&stdate=&enddate=.
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market dominant position against Hanjin Heavy Industries, its contractor in
the development of a terminal.'16

E.

COURT

DECISIONS

On August 17, 2016, the Seoul High Court overturned the corrective
orders and administrative fines charged by the KFFC against three
commercial freight vehicle manufacturers for allegedly colluding to fix
prices.117

X.

South Africal1

A.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Criminal liability for certain competition law breaches was introduced in
South Africa through section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act, No
1 of 2009.19 This law provides that directors and persons with management
authority which cause a firm to engage in collusion are guilty of an offense
and may be liable for a fine and/or imprisonment. 120 The amendment had
been on the books, waiting for promulgation, since 2009.
The Competition Commission (Commission) published its final
Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in Merger
Regulation.121 The guidelines are intended to clarify how the Commission

will evaluate the public interest consequences of mergers (including impacts
on employment).

B.

MERGERS

The Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) imposed the highest administrative
penalty to date for failure to notify a merger and prior implementation when
it confirmed a consent agreement between the Competition Commission
116. See KFTC Press Release on Incheon International Airport's Abuse of Market Dominance

Case, 23 February 2016, available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/report
boView.jsp?report-data no=6579&tribu-type-cd=&report datadivcd=&currpage=
36&searchKey=searchVal=&state=&enddate=.
117. See Seoul High Court Decision, decision numbers 2014nu46951,2014nu719 and
2014nu41239, 17 Aug. 2016.
118. The section on South Africa was authored by Lara Granville. The Author would like to
thank Roxanne Bain for her assistance.
119. Proclamation No. 25 of 2016, GG 39952 (22 April 2016), available at http://www.gov.za/
2
sites/www.gov.za/files/39952_proc 5.pdf.
120. Section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act, 2009, GN 875 of GG 32533, at 16 (28
32
533_875.pdf.
August 2009), available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/
121. Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in Merger Regulation under
the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998, GN 309 of GG 40039 (31 May 2016), available at http://
9
www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/40039_gen30 .pdf.
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and Life Healthcare Group (Proprietary) Limited and Joint Medical
Holdings Limited, under which the parties agreed to pay (RIO million).122
The Tribunal approved the mergers between Anheuser-Busch Inbev SA/
NV and SABMiller plc (ABInbev/SABMiller)123 and Coca-Cola Beverages
Africa Limited and Various Coca-Cola Bottling and Related Operations
(Coca-Cola).124 Both mergers included the imposition of stringent
conditions to address public interest concerns following extensive
engagement with the Minister of Economic Development. In ABInbev/
SABMiller, in addition to a moratorium on retrenchments which is to
endure indefinitely, the merging parties undertook to invest RI billion for
the development of agricultural outputs and the promotion of black farmers
in South Africa. Similarly, in Coca-Cola, the merging parties agreed to
establish an enterprise development fund to which they must contribute at
least R400 million.
C.

CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

After many years of facing multiple competition complaints for its
conduct in the flat steel, long steel, and scrap metal sectors, ArcelorMittal
South Africa Limited (AMSA) agreed to settle all the complaints against it
and pay an administrative penalty of R1.5 billion.125 This amount is the
largest fine for anticompetitive conduct imposed on a single company in
South Africa's history. Furthermore, AMSA agreed to cap its profits over a
period of five years and committed to R4.5 billion capital expenditure over
the same period.
The Commission conducted several dawn raids at companies operating in
the glass, packaging, and cargo shipping industries as part of its
investigations into alleged anticompetitive practices.126
122. Competition Comm'n v. Life Healthcare Group Ltd.and Joint Medical Holdings, Ltd. 2016,
Competition Tribunal (S. Afr.), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/cases/consent-order/
retrievecase/2056.

123. Anheuser-Busch Inbev SA/NV and Sabmiller PLC, Annexure A: Conditions,
LM211JAN16(023283), Competition Tribunal at 10, 19-20, 23, available at http://www
.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/INBEV/Final-Conditions-PUBLIC-VERSION-signaturedocument-2.pdf.

124. Mergers and Acquisitions' Report, CT Case No. 021154, Competition Tribunal, at 118
(19 March 2015), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Coca-Cola/Non-confi
2
dential% 0report%20with%20additional%20confidential%20info%20redacted%20

20%201%20 ... .pdf.
125. In the matter between Competition Comm'n of S. Afr. And Arcelorimttal S. Africa Ltd.,

CRO92JanO7/SAO90Augl6, Competition Tribunal at 18 (22 Aug. 2016), availableat http://www
.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/AMSA-Non-Confidential.pdf.
126. See Media Release, Competition Comm'n Raids Cargo Shipping Companies, Competition
Comm'n (28 Sept. 2016), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/MediaStatementCompetition-Commission-raids-cargo-shipping-companies_28Sepl6.pdf;
Media

Release, Competition Comm'n Raids Offices of Suppliers of Packaging Paper, Competition
Comm'n (26 May 2016),
http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/
Competition-Commission-raids-offices-of-suppliers-of-paper-packaging-products.pdf.
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The Commission's market inquiries into the healthcare sector, the retail
grocery sector and the liquid petroleum gas industry are still ongoing. The
healthcare inquiry panel released papers for comment on medical schemes
claims data, market definition for the financing of healthcare, and a
consumer survey.127 The retail grocery inquiry panel has received
submissions on its statement of issues.128 The Commission has released draft
9
recommendations in the LPG inquiry.12

D.

ABUSES OF DOMINANCE

Media24 was found to have contravened section 8(c) of the Act by
engaging in predatory pricing to force a rival newspaper out of the market.o30
As this was Media24's first contravention of section 8(c), an administrative
penalty was not imposed. The Tribunal therefore imposed a "credit
guarantee remedy" under which Media24 was to ensure that current or new
participants in the relevant market shall be entitled to credit terms with an
associate company of Media24. Media 24 has appealed both the finding of a
contravention as well as the remedy imposed, while the Commission has
lodged a cross-appeal, seeking an order that Media24 contravened section
8(d)(iv) of the Act, namely "selling goods or services below their marginal or
average variable cost," rather than section 8(c). This offense trigger an
administrative penalty for a first time offender.
E.

Court Decisions

In August 2016, the High Court of South Africa ordered South African
Airways Limited to pay R104.6 million in damages to Nationwide Airlines
Proprietary Limited (Nationwide) for abusing its dominance in the airline
industry and causing Nationwide's demise.131

127. Healthcare Inquiry, THE COMPETITION COMM'N OF S. AFR. (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www
.compcom.co.za/healthcare-inquiry/.
128. Retail Market Inquiry, THE COMPETITON COMM'N OF S. AnR., http://www
.compcom.co.za/retail-market-inquiry/.
129. Liquefied Petroleum Gas ("LPG') Market Inquiry, THE COMPETITION COMM'N OF S. AFR.
(May 2016), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/LPG-Market-Inquiry-

recommendations-for-Comments-10052016F.pdf.
130. Supplementary Affidavit, In the matter between: The Competition Comm'n and Media24 Ltd.,
92/CR/OCT11 at 3, available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Media24/

Supplementary-Affidavit.pdf.
131. Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. South Africa Airways (Pty) Ltd. 2016
ZAGPJHC 213, (6) SA 19 (GJ), (4) All SA 153 (GJ), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/
2016/213.html.
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United Kingdoml32

A.

[VOL. 51

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In comparison to 2015, when the enactment of the Consumer Rights Act
2015 substantially changed the landscape for private enforcement of
competition law violations, there have been far fewer legislative
developments of note. The most significant change of 2016 is yet to occur,
when before December 27, 2016, the UK Government is required to
implement the EU Damages Directive, which is intended to harmonize the
rules governing private enforcement of competition claims across the EU.133
The UK's private enforcement regime already largely conforms to the
Damages Directive, but there are several areas requiring legislative changes
for compliance. The most significant changes will be codifying the right of
defendants to use the passing-on defense, the nature and scope of which is
currently unclear under UK law, and giving courts the power to quantify
harm where it is excessively difficult for a claimant to do so on the evidence.
The Damages Directive also introduces a rebuttable presumption that
cartels cause harm.134
Although not a legislative development in itself, the UK's decision in June
to leave the EU has wide-ranging implications for the nature and
enforcement of competition law in the UK. Currently, the UK is still subject
to the obligation to transpose EU directives into UK law.

B.

MERGERS

In July, the CMA provisionally approved Celesio's takeover of Sainsbury's
277 pharmacies (which are mostly located within Sainsbury's own
supermarkets). To avoid a substantial reduction of competition, the CMA
has required Celesio, which already operates around 1540 pharmacies across
the UK, to sell pharmacies in twelve areas where it currently competes
particularly closely with Sainsbury's for the takeover to go ahead. It may not
close the pharmacies.s35
C.

CARTELS AND OTHER ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES

To date, no prosecutions have been brought under the new criminal cartel
offense introduced in 2014, but in March an individual, Barry Cooper,
132. The section on the United Kingdom was authored by Jonathan Tickner & Jasvinder

Nakhwal, Peters & Peters.
133. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, UK Implementation of EUAntitrustDamages Directive:
Significant Changes to Rules on Antitrust Damages Actions Gan. 25, 2017), https://www
.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/01/uk-implementation-eu-antitrust-damagesdirective-significant-changes.
134. Id.
135. Press Release, Competition and Markets Authority, Pharmacy Merger Gets Conditional
Go-Ahead (uly 29, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pharmacy-merger-getsconditional-go-ahead.
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pleaded guilty under the old offense as part of an ongoing CMA
investigation into "price-fixing and market-sharing in the supply of precast
concrete drainage products."36 The CMA decided last year to close its
other two open investigations into criminal cartels.137
Civil penalties of £2.2m and £826,000 were imposed on a fridge supplier35
and a bathroom supplierl39 respectively, for seeking to prevent dealers or
retailers offering online discounts. In its civil investigation into a cartel
relating to galvanized steel tanks, which was the subject of criminal
proceedings last year, the CMA announced that three parties agreed to pay
£2.6m in fines.140
D.

COURT CASES

In Deutsche Bahn AG v MasterCard Incorporated,141 the Court made a
number of comments regarding the use of counterfactuals in competition
law cases. MasterCard argued in its Defence that, absent the conduct at
issue, its prices would have been no different, to which the claimants replied
that this was only because MasterCard was engaging in a separate form of
anti-competitive conduct, about which no complaint had been made in the
original claim. The Court found that a claimant may argue that any
unlawful aspects of a defendant's conduct, including those not previously at
issue, should not form part of the counterfactual, even if that conduct was
not raised in the Defence. Moreover, claimants may be allowed to amend
their Particulars to include time-barred allegations about unlawful aspects of
the defendant's conduct, provided any new claims arise out of facts already at
issue.

136. Dr. Michael Grenfell, CMA Executive Director - Enforcement, Speech at the IFLR
Competition Law Forum (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/michaelgrenfell-on-the-cmas-progress-in-enforcing-competition-law.
137. Id.
138. Press Release, Competition and Markets Authority, Fridge Supplier Fined £2.2 million for
Restricting Online Discounts (May 24, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/govermnent/news/fridgesupplier-fmed-22-miulion-for-restricting-online-discounts.
139. Press Release, Competition and Markets Authority, Bathroom Supplier Fined £826,000
for Restricting Online Prices (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/bathroomsupplier-fined-826000-for-restricting-online-prices.
140. Press Release, Competition and Markets Authority, Water Tank Firms Admit Cartel and
Agree to Pay 22.6 Million Fines (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/watertank-firms-admit-cartel-and-agree-to-pay-26-million-fines.
141. Deutsche Bahn AG and Others v. MasterCard Inc. and Others, [2015] 2015 EWHC 3749
(CH), available at https://competitionlawblog.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/deutsche-bahn-agand-others-v-mastercard-incorporation-and-others.pdf.
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United Statesl42
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The House passed a bill to amend the Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts to align the merger review standards and processes for the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with those of the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division (DOJ).143 The bill is now under consideration by the
Senate.

B.

MERGERS

Both agencies continued their aggressive approach to horizontal mergers,
bringing several court proceedings to block transactions, resulting in the
transactions being enjoined or abandoned by the parties. The most notable
proceedings have been in the healthcare field.
The FTC brought district court proceedings to challenge two significant
hospital mergers. In both cases, two different district courts denied the FTC
a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the FTC had not met its
burden to establish an appropriate geographic market.-4 On appeal, both
decisions were overturned.145 Both appellate courts endorsed the FTC's
approach to geographic market definition, relying on the "hypothetical
monopolist" test outlined in the agencies' Horizontal Merger Guidelines,146
and stressed that in the hospital merger context the appropriate "consumers"
that may be subject to immediate anticompetitive impact are insurers, not
patients.
In July 2016, the DOJ sued to block two major transactions in U.S. health
insurance markets: the acquisition of Cigna by Anthem, and the acquisition
of Humana by Aetna. The transactions would reduce from five to three the
number of large, national health insurers in the U.S., raising concerns about
restricting competition in plans and services sold to large employers, as well
142. The section on the United States was authored by Lis1 Dunlop, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips,

LLP.
143. H.R. 2745, 114th Cong. (2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114thcongress/house-bill/2745.
144. Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 185 F. Supp. 3d 552, 564 (M.D.
Pa. 2016), rev'd and remanded, 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016); Fed. Trade Conm'n. v. Advoc.
Health Care, 15 C 11473, 2016 WL 3387163, at *13 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2016), rev'd and
remanded sub nom; Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. Advoc. Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460 (7th Cir.
2016).
145. Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 353-54 (3d Cir.
2016); Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. Advoc. Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 476 (7th Cir. 2016).
146. Horizontal Merger Guidelines (August 19, 2010), U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade
Comm'n, at 8, availableat http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf; see Penn State, 838 F.3d at
336; Advoc. Health, 841 F.3d at 473.
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as Medicare Advantage plans.147 Those cases are being tried in two district
court proceedings in late 2016.
C.

CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

The DOJ has focused its criminal antitrust enforcement on domestic
investigations in industries such as public real estate foreclosure and tax lien
auctions, water treatment chemicals, heir location services, and online poster
sales. The DOJ also continues to investigate and prosecute companies and
executives for conspiracies in several global industries: automotive parts;
cathode ray tubes; capacitors; LIBOR; and "roll-on, roll-off' ocean cargo.
Overall, in 2016 DOJ collected approximately $400 million in fines,
obtained guilty pleas for jail terms for individual corporate executives, and
obtained a number of criminal indictments for both individuals and
corporations. The DOJ continues to make identifying and punishing
culpable individuals a high priority.148
D.

COURT

DECISIONS

American Express successfully appealed a district court decision ruling
that the company's "anti-steering" rules violated antitrust law.149 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals said that the lower court incorrectly
focused on the impact of the restrictions on merchants without considering
the benefits American Express delivers to consumers. The DOJ and plaintiff
states have sought a rehearing en banc.
The Second Circuit also vacated a $147 million district court judgment
against two Chinese companies relating to the Vitamin C cartel at the
request of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The Second Circuit said
that "courts are bound to grant deference to a foreign government's
interpretation of its own laws and that the lower court abused its discretion
by asserting jurisdiction in the case."

147. See Justice Departmentand State Attorneys General Sue to Block Anthem's Acquisition of Cigna,
Aetna's Acquisition of Humana, Guly 21, 2016), Dep't of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/

justice-department-and-state-attorneys-general-sue-block-anthem-s-acquisition-cigna-aetna-s.
148. Deputy Assistant Attorney GeneralBrent Snyder Delivers Remarks at the Yale Global Antitrust
Enforcement Conference (Feb. 21, 2016), Dep't of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
deputy-assistant-attorey-general-brent-snyder-delivers-remarks-yale-global-antitrust.
149. The anti-steering rules prohibited merchants from encouraging customers to use credit
cards other than American Express. See U.S. v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016).
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